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Abstract. In this paper we analyze judgement aggregation problems in which a group of agents in-
dependently votes on a set of complex propositions that has some interdependency constraint between
them (e.g., transitivity when describing preferences). We consider the issue of judgement aggrega-
tion from the perspective of approximation. That is, we generalize the previous results by studying
approximate judgement aggregation. We relax the main two constraints assumed in the current liter-
ature, Consistency and Independence and consider mechanisms that only approximately satisfy these
constraints, that is, satisfy them up to a small portion of the inputs. The main question we raise is
whether the relaxation of these notions signicantly alters the class of satisfying aggregation mecha-
nisms. The recent works for preference aggregation of Kalai, Mossel, and Keller t into this framework.
The main result of this paper is that, as in the case of preference aggregation, in the case of a subclass
of a natural class of aggregation problems termed `truth-functional agendas', the set of satisfying aggre-
gation mechanisms does not extend non-trivially when relaxing the constraints. Our proof techniques
involve boolean Fourier transform and analysis of voter in
uences for voting protocols.
The question we raise for Approximate Aggregation can be stated in terms of Property Testing. For
instance, as a corollary from our result we get a generalization of the classic result for property testing
of linearity of boolean functions.
Keywords: judgement aggregation, truth-functional agendas, computational social choice, computational
judgement aggregation, approximate aggregation, inconsistency index, dependency index
1 Introduction
A famous jury paradox shows that aggregating complex decisions might be non-trivial. Assume a jury is
faced with a case in which a defendant is accused of murder. The legal doctrine (known by all of them) is
that the defendant should be convicted if and only if they are convinced that a)The defendant indeed killed
the victim and b)The defendant is sane. We assume that each of the jurors decides his opinion on the two
issues independently and based on these decisions decides whether to convict. Then, the members cast their
votes simultaneously and we assume no strategic behavior on their behalf. Kornhauser and Sager[25] noticed
that it's possible to have an opinion prole in which, when applying issue-wise aggregation using majority,
which seems natural1, we get a discrepancy between the majority vote on the conviction question and the
? The research was supported by a grant from the Israeli Science Foundation (ISF) and by the Google Inter-
university center for Electronic Markets and Auctions
? Previous versions of this work were presented at Bertinoro Workshop on Frontiers in Mechanism Design 2010,
Third International Workshop on Computational Social Choice, D usseldorf 2010, and Computation and Economics
Seminar at the Hebrew University. The author would like to thank the participants in these workshops for their
comments.
? A shorter version of this work was published in WINE-2011[44]
1 although it is not the common aggregation method of jurors (or judges in a tribunal in most countriesconjunction of the majority vote on the two basic questions (whether the defendant killed and whether he is
sane)2. This discrepancy is termed The Doctrinal Paradox. Lately, in [27], List showed that the probability to
get such a discrepancy is non-negligible under the uniform distribution and also under other mild relaxations
of it (still assuming the voters are i.i.d.).
This insight, that is common to many aggregation problems (e.g., Condorcet paradox for preference
aggregation), started the eld of `Judgement Aggregation' and nowadays this eld is the subject of a growing
body of works in economics, computer science, political science, philosophy, law, and other related disciplines.
We nd this eld highly applicable to agent systems, voting protocols in a network and other frameworks in
which one needs to aggregate a lot of opinions in a systematic way without letting the voters deliberate. An
aggregation problem in our context concerns a given Agenda, which is a set of f0;1g vectors of length m
(the number of issues), that denes the consistent (legal/rational/admissible) opinions that an individual
might hold. Given an agenda, Aggregation Theory deals with exploring ways to aggregate the opinions of
(often many) experts/judges while maintaining two main syntactical properties:
{ Consistency - always returning an admissible opinion.
In our example, the aggregated opinion should be to convict i the aggregated opinion was that indeed
the defendant killed and is sane.
{ Independence - dene the aggregated opinion on each issue independently of the votes on other issues.
This criterion can be seen as respecting the structure of the agenda instead of handling it as a set of
several dierent opinions (in the example above, four) disregarding the structure.
Most of these works nd the set of `acceptable' aggregation mechanisms (i.e., that satisfy the two criteria) to
be very small and undesired (e.g., dictatorships) and hence are considered as impossibility results. A survey
of this eld can be found in [30,28]. Such impossibility results are quite strong, they show the impossibility
of nding any reasonable aggregation mechanism that satises the two conditions and hence for (almost)
every mechanism there will always be some judgement prole that leads to a breakdown of the mechanism.
In this work we extend the question to `Approximate Judgement Aggregation'. We relax the above
two properties and search for an aggregation mechanism that only approximately respects the structure of
opinions and up to a small fraction of the inputs returns a consistent opinion. More specically, we are
interested in exploring the in
uence of relaxing the two properties on the set of `acceptable' aggregation
mechanisms.
We quantify being almost consistent by dening -consistency of an aggregation mechanism F as having
a consistent aggregation mechanism G that disagrees with F on at most  fraction of the inputs3. Similarly, we
quantify being almost independent by dening -independence of an aggregation mechanism F as having
an independent aggregation mechanism that disagrees with F on at most  fraction of the inputs. Both
terms can be equivalently dened as the failure probability of tests as we show in Section 2. Both denitions
use the Hamming distance between mechanisms dX(F;G) = Pr[F(X) 6= G(X) j X 2 Xn]. It includes two
assumptions: uniform distribution over the opinions for each voter and assuming voters draw their opinions
independently (Impartial Culture Assumption). These assumptions, while certainly unrealistic, are the
natural choice in this kind of work and are discussed further in Section 2.
Lately there is a series of works coping with impossibility results in Social Choice Theory using approx-
imations (e.g., [6,19]). In some cases allowing approximation enables signicantly better results, while in
other cases, hardly anything is gained by allowing it. For example, in [6] the authors deal with preference
aggregation and show that when one approximates Dodgson's scoring rule one can achieve several desired
properties (monotonicity, homogeneity, and low complexity) that cannot be achieved without this relaxation.
On the other hand, in [19] the authors also deal with aggregation of preferences and show that relaxing the
2 For instance, the following prole:
Killed Sane Guilty
25% of the jurors: X X X
33% of the jurors: X  
42% of the jurors:  X 
3 Formally, Pr[F(X) 6= G(X) j X 2 X
n] 6 .
2strategy-proofness property does not extend the set of satisfying aggregation mechanisms non-trivially and
by that they strengthen the classic impossibility result of Gibbard & Satterthwaite. In this work we formalize
(as far as we found for the rst time) this question of quantifying the in
uence of relaxing the constraints
and query whether one can use this in order to circumvent the impossibility results (as in [6]) or whether we
strengthen the impossibility results (as in [19]).
In this paper we study a family of agendas: truth-functional agendas in which each conclusion is dened
as conjunction or xor of several premises (up to input & output negation). In a truth-functional agenda the
issues are divided into two types: premises and conclusions. Each conclusion j is characterized by a boolean
function j over the premises and an opinion is consistent if the answers to the conclusion issues are attained
by applying the function j on the answers to the premise issues.
X =

x 2 f0;1gm xj = j(premises) for every conclusion issue j.
	
For instance the (2-premises) conjunction agenda used in the example above is a truth-functional agenda
with two premises and one conclusion and we notate the agenda by hA;B;A ^ Bi.
For all the agendas we examined, we show that relaxing the two constraints, consistency and indepen-
dence, does not extend the set of acceptable aggregation mechanisms in a non-trivial way.










(i.e., m+1 issues where the consistency means that the last one should be a parity
bit of the rst m). For these agendas we prove
Theorem.
1. For any m > 2,  > 0, and n > 2, there exists (;n;m) polynomial in n and  (but degrades exponentially
in m) s.t. if an aggregation mechanism F over n voters for the m-premises conjunction agenda is -
independent4 and -consistent5, then it is -close to a consistent independent aggregation mechanism G6.





(for some constant C>0),
2. For any m > 2,  > 0, and n > 2, there exists (;m) linear in  (and degrades quadratically in m) s.t.
if an aggregation mechanism F over n voters for the m-premises xor agenda is -independent4 and
-consistent5, then it is -close to a consistent independent aggregation mechanism G6.
Moreover,  = 
m(2m+3)
We have a characterization for the sets of the independent and consistent aggregation mechanisms for
the two agendas. For the conjunction agenda, an independent aggregation mechanism is consistent if either
it returns constant False for one of the premises (and for the conjunction issue) or if it aggregates all the
issues using the same oligarchy aggregation function (i.e., ^
i2S
xi for some coalition S - returns True if all
the member of a coalition S voted True). This characterization is a direct corollary from a series of works
in the more general framework of aggregation, e.g., [35,13] and for completeness we include a proof of it in
the appendix. For the xor agenda, our proof implies a characterization of the independent and consistent
aggregation mechanism which states that an independent aggregation mechanism is consistent if (essentially)
all the issues are aggregated using the same linear aggregation function of the form (x) = 
i2S
xi (for some
coalition S  [n]).
Hence, the above theorem can be seen as an impossibility result saying that it is impossible even to
nd a mechanism that is almost consistent and almost independent besides the trivial answers: independent
consistent mechanism and perturbations of them which is (still) a relatively small and undesired collection
of mechanisms.
4 I.e., there exists an independent (not necessarily consistent) aggregation mechanism G that returns the same
aggregated opinion as F for at least (1   ) fraction of the proles.
5 I.e., F returns a consistent result for at least (1   ) fraction of the proles.
6 I.e., F returns the same aggregated opinion as G for at least (1   ) fraction of the proles.
3Our results are invariant to negation of issues (which is merely renaming), and hence we can eas-
ily generalize the results to other agendas such as
D










. Using induction we can generalize the result to more complex agendas that




. We notice that this generalize our






for any function 7 and to any ane agenda (I.e.,
the set of admissible opinions form an ane space).
1.1 Previous works
There is a long line of works trying to circumvent impossibility results in Aggregation Theory (i.e., results
which state that the set of consistent independent aggregation mechanisms is very small and undesired).
Most of these works suggest consistent aggregating mechanisms while still trying to stay `reasonably close'
to independence (E.g., [25,24,37,29,10,5,26,11,38]). These classical works are heuristic, sometimes use the
semantics of the agenda, and mainly do not prove bounds on the compliance to the independence property.
In [27], List studies the asymptotic probability of getting an inconsistent result in the 2-premises conjunction
agenda hA;B;A ^ Bi for voter-independent distributions and common (majority-based & supermajority-
based) aggregation mechanisms. He mainly studies the conditions for the probability to converge to zero and
to one. As far as we found, this is the only work that deals with quantifying, although only asymptotically,
the property compliance of an aggregation mechanism for agendas other than the Arovian agenda (preference
aggregation).
Another approach is Approximate Aggregation. This line of research started with [21] and was extended
in [33,22]. In these works the authors deal with preference aggregation (although without stating the general
framework of approximate aggregation) and show that relaxing the transitivity constraint (which is equivalent
to consistency for this agenda) does not extend the set of satisfying aggregation mechanisms non-trivially.
Theorem ([22] Theorem 1.3). There exists an absolute constant C such that the following holds: For any
 > 0 and k > 3, if f is an aggregation mechanism for the preference agenda over k candidates that satis-
es independence and C 
 
=k23
-consistency, then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satises
independence and consistency such that d(F;G) < .
This result is neither derived by our results nor derives them because the agendas we deal with and the
preference agenda are too dierent (For instance, the preference agenda cannot be represented as a truth-
functional agenda and in some sense it is even far from it).
1.2 Connection to Property Testing
We think it might be useful to phrase the question of approximate aggregation using terminology of property
testing. In this eld we query a function at a small number of (random) points, testing for a global property
(in our case, the property is being a consistent independent aggregation mechanism). For example, a corollary
of the results we present in this paper (in property testing terms):
For any three binary functions f;g;h : f0;1gn ! f0;1g, if the probability Pr[f(x)g(y) = h(xy)] is
larger than (1 ) (when the addition is in Z2 and Zn
2, respectively), then there exists three binary functions
f0;g0;h0 : f0;1gn!f0;1g such that Pr[f(x)6=f0(x)], Pr[g(x)6=g0(x)], and Pr[h(x)6=h0(x)] are smaller than
C for some constant C independent of n and 8x;y : f0(x)g0(y) = h0(xy).
A special case of this result, f = g = h, is the classic result of Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld ([3,1]) for linear
testing of boolean functions. We discuss this connection further and its possible implications in in Section
5.
7 The case of a function that ignores one of the two arguments (or both) is trivial.
41.3 Techniques
We prove the main theorem by proving the specic case of independent aggregation mechanism for two basic
agenda families: the conjunction agendas (agendas in which there is exactly one conclusion that is constrained
to be the conjunction of the premises. Theorem 3) and the xor agendas (agendas in which there is exactly
one conclusion that is constrained to be the xor of the premises. Theorem 4). Later we extend these theorems
to the general theorem of relaxing both constraints (Theorem 5) using an agenda-independent method.
We use two dierent techniques in the proofs. For the conjunction agendas we study in
uence measures
of voters on the issue-aggregating functions8. and for the xor agendas we use Fourier analysis of the issue-
aggregating functions.
An open question is whether one can nd such bounds for any agenda or whether there exists an agenda for
which the class of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy consistency and independence expands non trivially
when we relax the consistency and independence constraints.
We proceed to describe the structure of the paper. In Section 2 we describe the formal model of aggre-
gation mechanisms. In Section 3 we present the main agendas we deal with, truth-functional agendas, and
specically conjunction agendas and xor agendas. In Section 4 we state the motivation to deal with approx-
imate aggregation. In Section 5 we describe the connection we nd between Approximate Aggregation and
the eld of Property Testing. In Sections 6 and 7 we describe our main theorems and outline the proof.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
We dene the model similarly to [13,14] (which is Rubinstein and Fishburn's model [41] for the boolean
case).
We consider a committee of n individuals that needs to decide on m boolean issues9. An opinion is
a vector x = (x1;x2;:::;xm) 2 f0;1gm denoting an answer to each of the issues. An opinion prole is a
matrix X 2 (f0;1g
m)
n denoting the opinions of the committee members, so an entry X
j
i denotes the vote of
the ith voter for the jth issue, the ith row of it Xi states the votes of the ith individual on all issues, and the
jth column of it Xj states the votes of each of the individuals on the jth issue. In addition we assume that
an agenda X  f0;1gm of the consistent opinions is given.
The basic notion in this eld is Aggregation Mechanism which is a function that returns an aggre-
gated opinion (not necessarily consistent) for every prole10 : F : (f0;1g
m)
n ! f0;1gm.
An aggregation mechanism satises Independence (and we say that the mechanism is indepen-
dent) if for any two consistent proles X and Y and an issue j, if Xj = Y j (all individuals voted the
same on the jth issue in both proles) then (F(X))j = (F(Y ))j (the aggregated opinion for the jth is-
sue is the same for both proles). This means that F satises independence if one can nd m boolean









dent aggregation mechanism satises systematicity if all issues are aggregated using the same func-








for some issue aggregating function f. We will use the notation 

f1;f2;:::;fm
for the independent aggregation mechanism that aggregates the jth issue using fj.
The main two measures we study in this paper are the inconsistency index ICX(F) and the depen-
dency index DIX(F) of a given aggregation mechanism F and a given agenda X. These measures are
8 Both the known in
uence (Banzhaf power index) and a new measure we dene: The ignorability of an individual
and of a coalition of individuals.
9 There is some literature on aggregating non-boolean issues, e.g., [41,15], but this is outside the scope of this paper.
10 We dene the function for all proles for simplicity but we are not interested in the aggregated opinion in cases
one of the voters voted an inconsistent opinion.
11 Notice this property is a generalization of the IIA property for social welfare functions (aggregation mechanism for
the preference agenda) so a social welfare function satises IIA i it satises independence as dened here (when
the issues are the pair-wise comparisons).
5relaxations of the consistency and independence criterion that are usually assumed in current works12.
We dene the measures in the following way:
Denition 1 (Inconsistency Index).
For an agenda X and an aggregation mechanism F for that agenda, the inconsistency index is dened to
be the probability to get an inconsistent result.13
ICX(F) = Pr[F(X) = 2 X j X 2 Xn]:
Denition 2 (Dependency Index14).








(F(X))j 6= (F(Y ))jjXj = Y j

:
The denition can be seen as a test for independence of the jth issue as discussed in Section 5
The dependency index DIX(F) is dened by: DIX(F) = max
j=1;:::;m
DIj;X(F)
In contexts where the agenda is clear we omit the agenda superscript and notate these as IC(F), DIj(F),
and DI(F), respectively.
We dene these two indices using local tests and prove that the more natural denition of distance to
the class of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy consistency (or independence) is equivalent to the above
(up to multiplication by a constant).
Proposition 1. Let F be an aggregation mechanism for an agenda over m issues. Then F satises
IC(F) 6  i there exists a consistent aggregation mechanism H that satises d(F;H) 6 .
Proposition 2. Let F be an aggregation mechanism and j an issue. If DIj(F) 6 , then there exists an
aggregation mechanism H that satises DIj(H) = 0 and d(F;H) 6 2. If DIj(F) > , then every aggregation
mechanism H that satises DIj(H) = 0, also satises d(F;H) > 1
2
Proposition 3. Let F be an aggregation mechanism for an agenda over m issues that satises DI(F) 6 .
Then there exists an independent aggregation mechanism H that satises d(F;H) 6 2m. If DI(F) > , then
every aggregation mechanism H that satises DI(H) = 0, also satises d(F;H) > 1
2
These denitions include two major assumptions on the opinion prole distribution. First, we assume the
voters pick their opinions independently and from the same distribution. Second, we assume a uniform
distribution over the (consistent) opinions for each voter (Impartial Culture Assumption). The uniform
distribution assumption, while certainly unrealistic, is the natural choice for proving `lower bounds' on
IC(F). That is, proving results of the format "Every `reasonable' aggregation mechanism of a given class
has inconsistency index of at least 
(n)". In particular, the lower bound, up to a factor , applies also to any
distribution that gives each preference prole at least a  fraction of the probability given by the uniform
distribution15. Note that we cannot hope to get a reasonable bound result for every distribution. For instance,
since for every aggregation mechanism we can take a distribution on proles for which it returns a consistent
opinion.
12 F satises consistency i IC(F) = 0 and independence i DI(F) = 0
13 In [27] List presented this measure under the name `Probability of a collective inconsistency' and studies its
asymptotical behavior for the conjunction agenda and the issue-wise majority aggregation mechanism.
14 In [33] Mossel denes similar measure for preference aggregation mechanism called -IIA. Our denition coincides
with his denition for this agenda.
15 In successive works we relax this assumption and prove similar results for more general distributions.
62.1 The Independence Property
The independence criterion is sometimes criticized as being unjustied normatively in most real-life scenar-
ios16. The impossibility results of judgement aggregation can also be seen as `empirical' argument against
independence since they show that it contradicts consistency which seems to be more desired. While we
accept this argument, we think our work quanties the tradeo between the two criteria. Moreover, in this
section we claim that this criterion can be justied on several dierent grounds.
First, in a lot of cases it is justied to expect, due to normative reasons or legal reasons, that changing an
individual judgement on an issue should not change the collective judgement on another issue. The rational
is usually that when the agenda is described as having a combinatorial structure (or perceived in such a way),
the aggregation method should respect the structure and not treat the agenda as a simple set of alternatives.
Secondly, as in the case of multi-issue voting domains[43], when the number of voters is small compared
to the agenda size (number of possible opinions) the natural ways of aggregating might be nonsignicant.
For instance, using plurality when the number of voters is too small could well result in a situation where
no outcome gets more than one vote, in which case plurality would give an extremely poor result.
In addition, there are works that defend this criterion by using manipulation-resistance arguments. In
[12] Dietrich and List dene the notion of manipulability of an aggregation mechanism17 and prove that
any aggregation mechanism that does not satisfy independence is manipulable. In this paper they further
prove that this manipulability property is equivalent to a more game-theoretic property of strategy-proofness
under some assumptions on players' preferences.
On the ground of simplicity of representation one can justify independence as a criterion that returns
aggregation mechanisms that are easy to represent, calculate, or justify (for instance, justify an election
result to the public).
Other grounds of justication for such aggregation mechanisms are from the voter point of view. There
are situations in which the decisions are made over time and place (dierent meetings) or by dierent
representatives of the same voting identity so it is fair to assume that when voting on an issue or aggregating
the votes it is unreasonable to depend on votes on other issues. Another argument might be that there are
scenarios in which you need to dene the aggregation method and only at a later stage choose from the
set of issues the relevant ones (For instance, the denition of Social Welfare Functions as returning a choice
function so only at a later stage the society is faced with the menu of alternatives).
2.2 Binary Functions
Since this work deals with binary functions (for aggregating issues), we need to dene several notions for
this framework as well. To ease the presentation, throughout this paper we will identify True with 1 and
False with 0 and use logical operators on bits and bit vectors (using entry-wise semantics).
Let f : f0;1gn ! f0;1g be a binary function. f is the oligarchy of a coalition S if it is of the form:
f(x) = ^
i2S
xi. This means that f returns 1 if all the members of S voted 1. We denote by Olig Olig Olig the class of
all 2n oligarchies. Two special cases of oligarchies are the constant 1 function which is the oligarchy of the
empty coalition and the dictatorships which are oligarchies of a single voter.
f is a linear function if it is of the form f(x) = 
i2S
xi for some coalition S18. This means that f returns
1 if an even number of the members of S voted 1. We denote by Lin Lin Lin the class of all 2n linear functions.
16 Chapman([7]) and Mongin([32]) attack this criterion and claim it removes the discipline of reason from social choice
since it disregards the intra-issue dependencies which is the essence of the problem. According to this criterion the
aggregation of `complex' issues is done without regarding the reasons of the voters for their opinions and hence
lacks the information for good aggregation.
17 An aggregation mechanism F is manipulable at the prole X by individual i(the manipulator) on issue j if
X
i
j 6= (F (X))j, but X
i
j = (F (X
0))j for some prole X
0 that diers form X in i`s vote only. I.e., the manipulator
disagrees with the aggregated opinion on issue j and can get his will on j by voting dierently.




7Two special cases of linear functions are the constant 1 function which is the xor function over the empty
coalition and the dictatorships which are xor of a single voter.
We say that f satises the Pareto criterion if f( 0) = 0 and f( 1) = 119. I.e., when all the individuals
voted unanimously 0 then f should return 0 and similarly for the case of 1.
We dene the following measures for the in
uence of an individual or a coalition of individuals on a
function f : f0;1gn ! f0;1g. Both denitions use the uniform distribution over f0;1gn (which is consistent
with the assumption we have on the prole distribution).
{ The In
uence20 of a voter i on f is dened to be the probability that he can change the result by
changing his vote.
Ii(f) = Pr[f(x) 6= f(xei)]
(xei = adding to x, ei(the ith elementary vector)=
ipping the ith bit 0 $ 1)
{ The (zero-)Ignorability of a voter i on f is dened to be the probability that f returns 1 when i voted 0.
Pi(f) = Pr[f(x) = 1 j xi = 0]
(We did not nd a similar index dened in the voting literature or in the cooperative games literature).
{ A generalization of the above denition is the (zero-)Ignorability of a coalition S  f1;:::;ng. It is
dened to be the probability that f returns 1 when one of the members of S voted 0. (So we get that
Pi(f) = Pfig(f).)
PS(f) = Pr[f(x) = 1 j 9i 2 S xi = 0]
In addition we dene a distance function over the binary functions. The distance between two functions
f;g : f0;1gn ! f0;1g is dened to be the probability of getting a dierent result (normalized Hamming
distance). d(f;g) = Pr[f(x) 6= g(x)]. From this measure we will derive a distance from a function to a set of
functions by d(f;G) = min
g2G
d(f;g) One more notation we are using in this paper is xJ for a binary vector
x 2 f0;1gn and a coalition J  f1;2;:::ng for notating the entries of x that correspond to J.
3 Agenda Examples
A lot of natural problems can be formulated in the framework of aggregation mechanisms. It is natural
to divide the agendas into two major classes Truth-Functional Agendas and Non Truth-Functional
Agendas.
3.1 Truth-Functional Agendas
A (k-premise) truth-functional agenda is dened by a conclusions function ( : f0;1gk ! f0;1gm k) from
the k premises to the (m   k) conclusions. An opinion is consistent if the answers to the conclusion issues
are attained by applying  on the answers to the premise issues.
X =

x 2 f0;1gm xj = j(x1;:::;xk) j = k + 1;:::;m
	
There are cases in which there might be more than one way to classify the issues to premises and conclu-
sions. For instance, the 2-premises xor agenda X = f001;010;100;111g can be dened both as hA;B;ABi
and as hA;AC;Ci. Since we choose to analyze the agenda as opinion sets (and not as a proposition set)
we do not handle this point and notice that it is irrelevant for our results.
These agendas, due to their structure, seem to be a good point to start our work on approximate aggre-
gation and in this paper we prove results for two families of truth-functional agendas. Later we derive results
for a more general family of truth-functional agendas.
19 In the literature this criterion is sometimes referred to as Unanimity, e.g., in [30]. We chose to follow [13,14] and
refer to it as Pareto to distinguish between it and the unanimity function which is the oligarchy of f1;2;:::;ng.
20 In the simple cooperative games regime, this is also called the Banzhaf power index of player i in the game f.





there are m + 1
issues to decide on and the consistency criterion is dened to be that the last issue is a conjunction of the
other issues. For instance the Doctrinal Paradox agenda is the 2-premises conjunction agenda.





there are m + 1 issues to
decide on and the consistency criterion is dened to be that the last issue is True if the number of true-valued
opinions for the rst m is even. An equivalent way to dene this agenda is constraining the number of True
answers to be odd.
3.2 Non Truth-Functional Agendas
One can think on a lot of agendas that cannot be represented as a truth-functional agenda. Among such
interesting natural agendas that were studied one can nd the equivalence agenda[18], the membership
agenda [40][31], and the preference agenda described below.
Preference Aggregation: Aggregation of preferences is one of the oldest aggregation frameworks studied.
In this framework there are s candidates and each individual holds a full strict order over them. We are
interested in Social Welfare Functions which are functions that aggregate n such orders to an aggregated







We nd the motivation for dealing with the eld of approximate judgement aggregation in three dierent
disciplines.
{ The consistent characterization are often regarded as `impossibility results' in the sense that they `per-
mit' a very restrictive set of aggregation mechanisms. (e.g., Arrow's theorem tells us that there is no
`reasonable' way to aggregate preferences). Extending these theorems to approximate aggregation char-
acterizations sheds light on these impossibility results by relaxing the constraints.
{ The questions of Aggregation Theory have often roots in Philosophy, Law, and Political Science.
There is a long line of works suggesting consistent aggregating mechanisms while still trying to stay
`reasonably close' to independence. The main general (not agenda-tailored) suggestions are premise-
based mechanisms and conclusion-based aggregation for truth-functional agendas (see, among others,
[25,24,37,29,10,5]), and a generalization of them to non-truth-functional agendas called sequential pri-
ority aggregation([26,11]). Another procedure in the literature is the distance-based aggregation([38])
which is well known for preference aggregation (E.g., Kemeny voting rule[23], Dodgson voting rule[2],
and lately a more systematic analysis in [16]). Our work contribute to this discussion by pointing out
where one should search for solutions while not leaving the consistency and independence constraints
entirely.
{ Connections to the Property Testing eld as discussed in Section 5.
5 Connection to Property Testing
In the words of [39], the eld of property testing deals with the following:
Given the ability to perform (local) queries concerning a particular object (e.g., a function or a graph),
the task is to determine whether the object has a predetermined (global) property (e.g., linearity or
bipartiteness), or is far from having the property. The task should be performed by inspecting only a small
(possibly randomly selected) part of the whole object, where a small probability of failure is allowed.
Property testing trades accuracy (the distance parameter) for eciency (number of queries).
21 The issue hi;ji (for i<j) represents whether an individual prefers ci over cj.
9We think it might be useful to view the Approximate Aggregation problem in the framework of Property
Testing. Below we highlight the connection between Approximate Aggregation and a special case of Property
testing termed `one-sided non-adaptive program testing'. For a general survey of the eld, one can read
[17,39,20].
In our case the global property we are trying to test is `consistency and independence' of an aggregation
mechanism. The class of satisfying aggregation mechanism is characterized by the current state of research.
It is clear that each of the components of this property separately, consistency and independence of an issue,
can be tested trivially. The consistency test consists of picking a (consistent) prole uniformly at random
and checking whether the aggregated opinion is consistent. The test for independence of issue j consists of
picking a (consistent) prole uniformly at random, altering randomly the opinion for each voter without
changing the jth bit and check whether the aggregated opinion on the jth issue is changed due to the altering.
For each of the two tests the probability to accept a non-satisfying mechanism is linear in the distance to the
satisfying set (and equals IC(F) and DIj(F), respectively). The main question of this work can be stated
using property testing terms as follows: What is the best test for being `consistent and independent' one can
assemble from running the (m+1) tests as black boxes (and therefore get information only on IC(F) and
DIj(F)).
Similar question was asked lately in [8]. In [8] the authors query (among other similar questions) the
conditions needed in order to deduce from testability of two properties the testability of the intersection
of the two properties. Our work can be seen as studying this question for a specic domain in which the
question seems to be natural while adding the constraint that the test of the intersection property should
be dened as a sequence of tests for the basic properties (in a non-adaptive way).
The main result of this paper is that for a class of mechanisms (corresponding to a natural class of
agendas) one can assemble those tests to a test for the property `consistent and independent'.
Similarly one can state questions dealing with sub-families of aggregation mechanisms. For example, as
we stated in the introduction, the classic result of Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld for linearity testing of boolean
functions is a direct corollary of our result for the 2-premises xor agenda when considering systematic
aggregation mechanisms.
Still, the target of the two elds is dierent. While Property Testing deals with nding the most e-
cient (query-wise) algorithm for testing a property (functions family), Approximate Aggregation deals with
analyzing a specic family of tests.
6 Main Results
The main result of this paper is
Theorem 1.
For any  > 0 and m;n > 2, there exists IC;DI = n 1   
m
poly(m)
, such that for every truth-functional
agenda X over m issues, in which each conclusion issue is dened to be either conjunction of several premises
or xor of several premises(up to negation of inputs or output)22, if F is an aggregation mechanism for X
over n voters satisfying IC-independence and DI-consistency, then there exists an aggregation mechanism
G that satises consistency and independence such that d(F;G) < 





  and DI = 1






A direct corollary is the following impossibility result.




and a truth-functional agenda X over m issues, in which each conclusion issue is dened to be either con-
junction of several premises or xor of several premises(up to negation of inputs or output), no aggregation
mechanism F for X over n voters satises the following three conditions:




, hA;B;C;A ^ B;B C;A _ Ci.
10{ -independence
{ -consistency
{ F is -far from any independent and consistent aggregation mechanism for X .
In the case of xor agenda (and its generalization, a truth-functional agenda in which all the conclusions
are xor) we can get a better result (particulary, no dependency on the number of voters)








. For any  < 1
6 and any ag-
gregation mechanism F:
If F is an aggregation mechanism for X over n voters satisfying -independence and -consistency,
then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satises consistency and independence such that
d(F;G) < m(2m + 3)
Noticing that any ane agenda (i.e., an agenda that is an ane subspace) can be represented as a truth-
functional agenda that uses xor conclusions only (Lemma 10) we can get the following corollary
Corollary 2. For any  > 0 and m;n > 2, there exists  = 
m(2m+3), such that for every ane agenda
X over m issues, if F is an aggregation mechanism for X over n voters satisfying -independence and
-consistency, then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satises consistency and independence
such that d(F;G) < 
7 Proof Sketch of the Main Theorem
In this section we sketch the techniques behind our proofs. The full proofs can be found in the appendices.
We prove the main theorem by proving three independent theorems. An approximation result for indepen-
dent aggregation mechanisms for conjunction agendas (Theorem 3). An approximation result for independent
aggregation mechanisms for xor agendas (Theorem 4). An agenda independent method of converting results
for the independent case to the general case of relaxing both constraints (Theorem 5). Using induction on the
number of conclusions and noticing that negating (of the inputs and of the output) is renaming of opinions



















for m > 2:
For any  > 0 and any independent aggregation mechanism F:
If IC(F) 6 , then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satises consistency and independence such
that d(F;G) < 8m(n)
1
2m 1.
There is a known characterization of the consistent independent aggregation mechanism for the conjunction
agenda. (This characterization is a direct corollary from a series of works in the more general framework of
aggregation, E.g., [35,13]. We include a proof of it in the appendix)
Lemma 1.





= 0. Then ei-
ther there exists an issue j s.t. fj = h  0 or f1 = f2 = ::: = fm = h 2 Olig.
A corollary from the above is a characterization of the approximate aggregation mechanisms for this agenda.
Actually, in the proof of Theorem 3 we get a tighter characterization that distinguishes between the rst







be an aggregation mechanism that satises IC(F) 6 . In case that fj for some
j is close to the constant zero function, F is close to the consistent aggregation mechanism that satises
fj = h = 0 (and all other issue-aggregating functions the same as in F).
Otherwise, all fj are -far from the constant zero function (for some ). The main insight in the proof
is that for any two issue-aggregating functions fj and fk, we can bound the product of the ignorability
of a coalition S for fk and the minimal in
uence of its members on fj using the inconsistency index of
F by PS(fk)  min
i2S
Ii(fj) 6 C  IC(F) for C a constant that depends solely on the size of S and on simple
characteristics of the other issue-aggregating functions. Using this insight we can prove that any of the fj




voters. So if  is big enough




is close to F and consistent. The latter is true since IC(G) is close to IC(F) (and hence small) but is




















For any < 1
6 and any independent aggregation mechanism F: If IC(F)6, then there exists an aggre-
gation mechanism G that satises consistency and independence such that d(F;G)6m.
Proof (Proof sketch). 23
The proof uses the Fourier representation of the issue aggregating functions. That is, representing the




b f() when b f() = E[f(x)(x)] = 1 2d(f;) = 2d(f; ) 1.
















(when xj are sampled uniformly and independently). On one hand we





c fj()b h(). Hence, when IC(F)
is small, this expression is close to one and hence there exists a linear function such that all fj, and h are
close to it (up to negation). Noticing that for any linear function , h;; ;i (and the result of negation
of any even number of functions) is a consistent independent aggregation mechanism for this agenda gives
us the result. u t




there exists a function (;n) s.t. for any  > 0 and n > 2, if F is an aggregation mechanism for X over
n voters satisfying independence and IC(F)6(), then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that
satises consistency and independence such that d(F;G)<.
Then,
23 The proof is similar to the analysis of the BLR (Blum-Luby-Rubinfeld) linearity test done in [1].
12for any  > 0 and n > 2, there exist IC;DI > 0, such that if F is an aggregation mechanism for X over
n voters satisfying IC(F) 6 IC and DI(F) 6 DI, then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that
satises consistency and independence such that d(F;G) < .
Moreover, one can take IC =  ((1   ))    and DI = 1
2m for any  2 [0;1] satisfying
 ((1   )) > 
In order to extend the results for the -dependent case (DI(F) 6= 0) we prove the following agenda-
independent proposition.
Proposition (Proposition 3). Let F be an aggregation mechanism for an agenda over m issues that sat-
ises DI(F) 6 . Then there exists an independent aggregation mechanism H that satises d(F;H) 6 2m.
If DI(F) > , then every aggregation mechanism H that satises DI(H) = 0, also satises d(F;H) > 1
2
I.e., if F is -independent we can nd a close consistent aggregation mechanism H and since it is close we
can deduce bounds on the proximity of F to the consistent and independent aggregation mechanisms from
bounds on this proximity of H. Similarly, since H is close to F, we can deduce that if F is -consistent then
H is 0-consistent for 0 close to . Combining these we get the theorem.
8 Summary and Future Work
In this paper we dened the question of approximate aggregation which is a generalization of the study of
aggregation mechanisms that satisfy consistency and independence. We dened measures for the relaxation
of the consistency constraint (inconsistency index IC) and for the relaxation of the independence constraint
(dependency index DI). To our knowledge, this is the rst time this question is stated in its general form.
We proved that relaxing these constraints does not extend the set of satisfying aggregation mechanisms
in a non-trivial way for any truth-functional agenda in which every conclusion is either conjunction or xor
up to negation of inputs or output. We notice that every conclusion of two premises can be stated as such
as well as any ane agenda. Particulary we calculated the dependency between the extension of this class
() and the inconsistency index (()) (although probably not strictly) for two families of truth-functional
agendas with one conclusion. The relation we proved includes dependency on the number of voters (n). In
similar works for preference agendas [21,33,22] the relation did not include such a dependency. An interesting
question is whether such a dependency is inherent for conjunction agendas or whether it is possible to prove
a relation that does not include it.
A major assumption in this paper is the uniform distribution over the inputs which is equivalent to
assuming i.i.d uniform distribution over the premises. We think that our results can be extended for other
distributions (still assuming voters' opinions are distributed i.i.d) over the space over premises' opinions
which seem more realistic.
Immediate extensions for this work can be to extend our result to more complex truth-functional agendas
and generalize our results to non-truth-functional agendas to get a result unifying our work and Kalai, Mossel,
and Keller's works for the preference agenda.
A major open question is whether one can nd an agenda for which relaxing the constraints of in-
dependence and consistency extends the class of satisfying aggregation mechanisms in a non-trivial way.
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15A Lemmas Proof - General
A.1 Propositions 4,6
For a given pair of independent aggregation mechanisms, the following propositions connect between the
pairwise distance between respective issue-aggregating functions (which we found easier to analyze in most
cases) and both the distance between the mechanisms and the dierence between the inconsistency indices
of them.
Proposition 4.
For any agenda X of m issues and any voting functions

















j X 2 Xn
:
Proof. Direct use of the union-bound inequality.
Proposition 5.









































































j X 2 Xn].












j X 2 Xn].
As a corollary of the above we derive
Proposition 6.
For any agenda X of m issues and any voting functions





















Let F be an aggregation mechanism and j an issue. If DIj(F) 6 , then there exists an aggregation mecha-
nism H that satises DIj(H) = 0 and d(F;H) 6 2. If DIj(F) > , then every aggregation mechanism H
that satises DIj(H) = 0, also satises d(F;H) > 1
2
Proof. With no loss of generality assume that j = 1.












j = 2;:::;m Gj(X) = (F(X))
j



























(F(X))1 6= (F(Y ))1jX1 = Y 1

= 2DI1(F)
{ Let F be an aggregation mechanism that is -close to satisfy DI1(F) = 0. That is, we can nd an







(F(X))1 6= (F(Y ))1jX1 = Y 1





Z2Xn[Z = X] Pr
Y 2Xn






Z2Xn[Z = X] Pr
Y 2Xn

(G(Y ))1 6= (F(Y ))1jX1 = Y 1
6 2 u t
A.3 Proposition 3
Proposition.
Let F be an aggregation mechanism for an agenda over m issues that satises DI(F) 6 . Then there exists
an independent aggregation mechanism H that satises d(F;H) 6 2m. If DI(F) > , then every aggregation
mechanism H that satises DI(H) = 0, also satises d(F;H) > 1
2
Proof.




















































{ The other direction is a direct corollary of Proposition 2. u t
A.4 Id Agenda
For completeness we add here an approximate aggregation theorem for the id agenda hA;Ai
Theorem 6.
For any  > 0 and any independent aggregation mechanism F:
If IChA;Ai 6 , then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satises consistency and independence
such that d(F;G) 6 .
Proof. This theorem is trivial since
IChA;Ai(hf;gi) = Pr[f(x) 6= g(y) j x = y] = Pr[f(x) 6= g(x)] = d(f;g)
Noticing that any aggregation mechanism of the form hf;fi is consistent for this agenda, we get the theorem.
18B Lemmas Proof - Conjunction agenda
B.1 Theorem 3
Theorem.








for m > 2:
For any  > 0 and any independent aggregation mechanism F:
If IC(F) 6 , then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satises consistency and independence such









is given such that IC(F) 6  and dene  = 4(n)
1
2m 1.









24 which is a consistent mechanism.
If 8j 2 f1;:::;mg : d(fj;0) > , then, based on the following lemma each of the functions fj is close
to a function that depends on a small number of voters.
Lemma 2.
Let f1;:::;fm;h : f0;1g













Then there exists a function g : f0;1g
































(and similarly for f2;:::;fm)
By choosing  = 41 m we get that there exist functions g1;:::;gm : f0;1gn ! f0;1g s.t.








Let h0 : f0;1gn ! f0;1g be a issue-aggregating function satisfying





















One the other hand, since the functions gj depend on a small number of voters, the inconsistency index
























m+1)=1] 6  + 
19Lemma 3. Let f1;:::;fm : f0;1gn ! f0;1g be m voting functions and J1;:::;Jm  f0;1;:::;ng coalitions








for some integer C.









Since max( + ; + 4mn1 m) 6 8m(n)
1
2m 1 (when n2 < 1), we get the theorem.
20B.2 Lemma 2
Lemma.
Let f1;:::;fm;h : f0;1g













Then there exists a function g : f0;1g
































(and similarly for f2;:::;fm)
Proof. The proof of the lemma is constructive and denes a junta J and the function g that depends only
on the votes of J. For proving the lemma, we dene for a given function f : f0;1gn ! f0;1g and a coalition
J (the junta), the junta function fJ : f0;1gn ! f0;1g. It is derived from f in the following way:
fJ(x) = majorityff(y) j yJ = xJg:
I.e., for a given input, fJ reads only the votes of the junta members, iterates over all the possible votes for
the members outside the junta, and returns the more frequent result (assuming uniform distribution over
the votes of the voters outside J).
In our case, we dene the junta to be all the voters with large in
uence
J = fi j Ii(f1) > g










This is a direct corollary of the following lemma and the denition of J.























Lemma 5. Let f1;:::;fm;h : f0;1gn ! f0;1g be m voting functions, S  f1;:::;ng a coalition.


















































































Let f1;:::;fm;h : f0;1gn ! f0;1g be m voting functions, S  f1;:::;ng a coalition.











Proof. With no loss of generality assume S = f1;2;:::;tg. Denote by E the event

8j > 3 : fj(xj) = 1

and by PrE[A] the probability Pr[A j E]. Then (We use the notation xei for adding ei (the ith elementary
vector) which is equivalent to 


















































; x2j[i 1] = 1 ^ x2



















; x2j[i 1] = 1 ^ x2









; x2j[i 1] = 1 ^ x2
























; x2j[i 1] = 1 ^ x2









; x2j[i 1] = 1 ^ x2













f1(x1) 6= f1(x1+ei) ; x2j[i 1] = 1 ^ x2












x2j[i 1] = 1 ^ x2


































































1   2 jSj m Q
j=3
Pr[fj(xj) = 1]  min
i2S
Ii(f1)  PS(f2) u t
23B.4 Lemma 4
Lemma.




Proof. We dene for a vector c 2 f0;1gJ the function fJ
c : f0;1gn ! f0;1g by fJ
c (x) = f(y) where




c (x)] < 1
2
1 Ec[fJ
c (x)] > 1
2
We will use the following isoperimetric inequality on the boolean cube:
Proposition (The Isoperimetric Inequality for The Boolean Cube [4]).
Let f : f0;1gn ! f0;1g be a voting function. Then
P
i
Ii(f) > min(E[f];1   E[f]).










c ];1   E[fJ
c ])






































































Pr[f(x) = 1] 6 Pr[xS =  1] + Pr[xS 6=  1 ^ f(x) = 1]
= Pr[xS =  1] + PS(f)(1   Pr[xS =  1])






Let f1;:::;fm : f0;1gn ! f0;1g be m voting functions and J1;:::;Jm  f0;1;:::;ng coalitions such that








for some integer C.










































Clearly there exists an issue-aggreagting function h : f0;1gn ! f0;1g that minimizes the expression




























25 We denote by (c
j; 0) the vector that equals to c
j on J
j and has zeroes elsewhere.
26B.7 Lemma 1
Lemma.





= 0. Then ei-
ther there exists an issue j s.t. fj = h  0 or f1 = f2 = ::: = fm = h 2 Olig.
Proof. Assume that for issues j, fj is not the constant zero function. We will prove that
f1 = f2 = ::: = fm = h 2 Olig by proving the following series of claims.
{ For all issues j, fj( 1) = 1




















I.e. h  0. From that we can conclude that there exists an issue j s.t. fj  0 and get a contradiction.
{ For all issues j fj = h
We will prove that f1 = h. The proof is similar for all j.















{ f1 2 Olig
Let J = fi j Ii(f1) 6= 0g. Then f1 is a function of fxigi2J. Based on lemma 5, for i 2 J Pi(f1) = 0 and
hence

xi = 0 ) f1(x) = 0

. So we get that f1 is the oligarchy of J. u t
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C.1 Theorem 4
Theorem.









For any < 1
6 and any independent aggregation mechanism F: If IC(F)6, then there exists an aggre-
gation mechanism G that satises consistency and independence such that d(F;G)6m.
Proof.
The theorem is a corollary of the following lemma:
(We rename the values from f0;1g to f1; 1g in order to ease the analysis (use multiplication instead of xor)
and in particular use the Fourier transformation for the issue-aggregating functions fj.26)
Lemma 7. Let f1;:::;fm : f 1;1g

















{ There exists a linear function  : f 1;1g
n ! f 1;1g dened as (x) =
Q
i2S









8j : d(fj;aj) 62
{ If  < 1
6, then there exists a linear function  : f 1;1g




coalition S and signs
 
aj
j=1;:::;m 2 f 1;1g such that
m Q
j=1






is a consistent mechanism for any linear function  and signs aj s.t.
m Q
j=1
aj = 1 gives
us the requested result by applying Proposition 4.
26 Fourier transforms are widely used in mathematics, computer science, and engineering. The main idea is repre-
senting a function f over an orthonormal basis to the functions space S when the inner product is dened to be
hf;gi = E[f(x)g(x)] and the basis vectors S are dened to be S(x) =
Q
i2S
xi for S  f1;:::;ng. The coecients
of f according to the Fourier basis are notated b f(S). I.e., f =
P
S
b f(S)S. For a good introduction to the subject
see [36,42].
In this proof we are using the following:
{ S(xy) = S(x)S(y)
{ E[S(x)T (x)] =









{ b f(S) = 1   2d(f;S) = 2d(f; S)   1
28Proof (Proof of Lemma 7).
The main ingredient in the proof is the following lemma that connects the inconsistency index with a simple
expression over the Fourier coecients of fj.
Lemma 8. Let f1;:::;fm : f 1;1g

































be an independent aggregation mechanism that satises IC(F) 6 .




















































































and hence there exists a coalition A and a sign a1 s.t. Pr[f1(x) 6= a1A(x)] 6 IC(f;g;h) = .























So we get that a1
m Q
j=2




aj = 1 and
ajc fj(A) > 1   4 so d(fj;ajA) 6 2.
Due to symmetry there is also a coalition B and a sign b2 such that d(f2;b2B) 6  and hence




0 a2 = b2 ^ A = B
1 a2 = b2 ^ A = B
1
2 A 6= B
.
Hence, if  < 1
6, we get that A = B, a2 = b2.
Due to symmetry we can repeat this for all fj. u t
29C.2 Lemma 8
Lemma.
Let f1;:::;fm : f 1;1g







































































c fj(S) u t
30C.3 Lemma 9
Lemma 9.




















Proof. We'll prove by induction over k.














































































































C.4 Ane Agenda - Lemma 10
Lemma 10. Let X be an ane subspace of f0;1gm of degree k.
Then X can be represented as a truth-functional agenda using xor conclusions only.
Proof.
X is an ane space and therefore can be represented as a linear subspace shifted by a constant vector.
Shifting is merely renaming of the opinions so with no loss of generality, assume that X is a linear subspace
dened by a matrix Akm of rank k in the following way X = fx 2 f0;1gm j Ax = 0g. There exists an
invertible matrix (representing the Gaussian elimination process) P s.t.
{ fx 2 f0;1gm j Ax = 0g = fx 2 f0;1gm j PAx = 0g
{ PA is in canonical form. I.e. for any row t 2 [k] there is a unique index at 2 [m] s.t. (PA)t;j = 1 i
j = at.
Hence X is a truth-functional agenda for the premises [m] n fatgt2[k] and conclusions based on the row of
PA.
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